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INTRODUCTION
Faced with a seemingly unending decline in its financial picture, Puerto Rico is in
dire need of a way to avoid an economic catastrophe.1 With a stagnant economy,2 lack of
industry,3 a rapidly declining population4 (and therefore rapidly declining taxing
revenue), and a high unemployment rate,5 Puerto Rico has been forced to take drastic
measures to address its unsustainable financial situation.6 On June 28, 2014, Puerto
Rico’s governor passed legislation to provide its public corporations7 with debt
adjustment, under what is essentially Chapter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code
(“the Code”).8 Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a municipality the opportunity
to discharge its debts.9 “Municipality” under the Code includes a public agency or

1

John Burnett, Island of Disenchantment, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 11, 2015, 8:00 AM),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2015/03/11/puerto-ricos-agencies-dont-needchapter-9-bankruptcy (“[Puerto Rico] is likely headed toward insolvency.”).
2
Steven B. Smith et al., Floating Ashore: An Overview of Puerto Rico’s Financial Crisis and Potential
Restructuring Alternatives, THE BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIST, 31 L. J. NEWSLETTER, June 1, 2014 (“Puerto
Rico’s economy [ ] has been in decline for several years, hurt by, among other things, the recession…”).
3
James Surowiecki, The Financial Page: The Puerto Rican Problem, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 6, 2015, at
22.
4
Burnett, supra note 1 (A “daily departure of more than 100 Puerto Ricans has taken thousands out of the
island’s productive workforce in the last few years.”).
5
See id. (“Puerto Rico’s unemployment rate is over 14 percent.”); AM. BANKR. INST., Moody’s: Puerto
Rico’s New Debt Law is Credit Negative for Financial Guarantors, Default Now More Likely, (Aug. 2014)
(“Puerto Rico’s 13.8 percent unemployment rate is more than double the U.S. average.”).
6
Michael A. Fletcher, Puerto Rico, With at Least $70 Billion in Debt, Confronts a Rising Economic
Misery, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2013, www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/puerto-rico-with-atleast-70-billion-in-debt-confronts-a-rising-economic-misery/2013/11/30/f40a22c6-5376-11e3-9fe0fd2ca728e67c_story.html.
7
Zachary H. Smith, Puerto Rico’s Municipal Debt Landscape Continues To Evolve, LAW360 (June 4,
2014,
4:47
PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/544331/puerto-rico-s-municipal-debt-landscapecontinues-to-evolve (“Puerto Rico public corporations include entities such as the Puerto Rico Electric
Power Authority, Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation
Authority, and others.”).
8
See Leonard Weiser-Varon et al., A Close Look at Puerto Rico’s Bankruptcy-Like Legislation, LAW360
(July 03, 2014, 9:58 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/553454/a-close-look-at-puerto-rico-sbankruptcy-like-legislation; see also Aaron Kuriloff, Puerto Rico Power Authority Bond Prices Sink, WALL
ST. J., June 30, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/puerto-rico-power-authority-bond-prices-sink1404162222.
9
11 U.S.C. §901 (2006) et seq.
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instrumentality of a state.10
The main problem with this legislation, claims a suit filed on behalf of Puerto
Rico’s bondholders, is that the bankruptcy laws, as granted by the United States
Constitution, are the singular domain of Congress.11 As a United States territory, this
raises the question of the constitutionality of Puerto Rico passing legislation that
essentially mirrors the United States Bankruptcy Code.12 Puerto Rico’s Act only allows
Puerto Rico’s public corporations the right to file bankruptcy, not Puerto Rico itself,13 but
such legislation directly conflicts with the Bankruptcy Code, which denies both Puerto
Rico and its municipalities access to the Code. Furthermore, where Congress has
established a uniform Bankruptcy Code, one that specifically includes Puerto Rico,
Puerto Rico’s creation of its own bankruptcy legislation creates an unconstitutional
Supremacy Clause conflict.
Defenders of the legislation point out that Puerto Rico is not a state and therefore
is not bound by the United States Code,14 nor is it in conflict with it, since there is not a
provision on point regarding Puerto Rico’s public corporations.15 However, the claim that
Puerto Rico is not a state is somewhat confused by the fact that, as a territory of the
United States, in many respects, the United States treats Puerto Rico no differently than
10

11 U.S.C. §101(40) (2006).
See Maria Chutchian, Puerto Rico’s New Debt Law Usurps Congress, Funds Say, LAW360 (June 30,
2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/552993/puerto-rico-s-new-debt-law-usurps-congressfunds-say?article_related_content=1.
12
Aaron Kuriloff, U.S. Investment Firms Challenge Puerto Rico Restructuring Law, WALL ST. J., June 29,
2014,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-investment-firms-challenge-puerto-rico-restructuring-law1404068742 (“The act is a bankruptcy law and ‘treads on the Congress’s exclusive province in enacting
such legislation.’”).
13
See id. (“The proposed bill . . . doesn’t include a way for the island’s general-obligation bonds and salestax debt to be restructured.”).
14
See id. (“The island’s Government Development Bank said it stands behind the Public Corporations Debt
Enforcement and Recovery Act and will defend it. Puerto Rico has a ‘sovereign’s right to pass its own debt
enforcement statutes in areas not covered by federal law.’”).
15
See generally Stephen J. Lubben, Puerto Rico and the Bankruptcy Clause, 88 AM. BANKR. L. J. 553
(2014).
11
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the states16 and the United States Bankruptcy Code expressly includes Puerto Rico in its
definition of a “state.”17 These conflicts are the backdrop of the analysis presented here.
Part I of this note presents the foundation of this conflict, briefly reviewing Puerto
Rico’s financial problems, its recently passed legislation, and its relationship to the
United States. Part II presents an overview of the United States Bankruptcy Code and
analyzes the constitutionality of Puerto Rico’s legislation. Part III of this note considers
the path taken by New York City during a time of extreme financial distress in the 1970’s
and suggests some possible directions that Puerto Rico could take to restructure its
finances in an attempt to avoid use of the bankruptcy statute.

I. BACKGROUND
A) Puerto Rico’s Financial Troubles
The worldwide recession of 2008 hit Puerto Rico especially hard.18 Adding fuel to
the fire of the greatest economic downturn since the Great Depression was the expiration
of a tax subsidy in 2006 which enabled American firms doing business on the island to
earn tax-free income.19 What was already an unsteady economy turned into a downward
spiral after the subprime mortgage implosion.20 With the majority of banks curtailing
lending in an effort to clean up their balance sheets, businesses were negatively impacted

16

See generally Adam D. Chandler, Note, Puerto Rico’s Eleventh Amendment Status Anxiety, 120 YALE
L.J. 2183 (2011).
17
11 U.S.C. §101(52).
18
Tim Fitzsimons, Global Recession Hits Puerto Rico Hard, NPR (Jan. 9, 2014, 4:29 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2014/01/09/260979934/global-recession-hits-puerto-rico-hard.
19
Lizette Alvarez, Economy and Crime Spur New Puerto Rican Exodus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2014,
www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/economy-and-crime-spur-new-puerto-rican-exodus.html (“Tax laws that
were once abundantly generous . . . came to a crash in 2006, after the 10-year phase-out of a subsidy that
provided American firms operating in Puerto Rico with tax-free income.”).
20
See id.
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by the inability to access capital.21 This lack of capital made it difficult for businesses to
run effectively, thereby creating additional problems as companies that were unable to
pay their bills began laying off employees.22 With an increase in unemployment, many
people curtailed their spending, which in turn further depressed the economy.23 With the
downturn in business, Puerto Rico began to feel the pressure of less tax revenue and its
increasing debt.24 As the tax revenue was insufficient to cover the commonwealth’s
budget, Puerto Rico’s government had no choice but to raise rates and taxes.25 With the
increase in taxes and the lack of employment, many citizens of Puerto Rico fled for the
mainland of the United States.26 Puerto Rico’s financial picture grew darker as its
population shrank and its tax base declined,27 leaving the commonwealth unable to
perform on the debt of its public corporations.28
Puerto Rico’s financial structure includes three different kinds of debt: the debt of
its public corporations, general obligation debt (debt that is payable on the general
income of the commonwealth, not attributable to any one revenue source), and sales tax

21

Eric Dash, Puerto Rican Lenders Face Their Own Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2010,
www.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/business/30fdic.html?_r=0 (“Loans are scarce, making life even harder for
many local businesses.”).
22
See id. (“A lending slowdown of this kind often causes a vicious circle — slower growth, more job losses
and, in turn, an even sharper pullback in lending.”).
23
Alan Gomez, Economy’s On Mend, But Puerto Ricans Still Desert Island, USA TODAY, Aug. 11, 2014,
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/11/puerto-rico-population-loss/13891661/.
24
See Alvarez, supra note 19.
25
See id. (“Last year, water rates rose 60 percent in a bid to help cut the state-run water company’s debt.”);
see id. (“Vowing not to lay off any more workers, he [Puerto Rico’s Governor, Garcia Padilla] raised taxes
sharply to provide much-needed revenue…”).
26
See Gomez, supra note 23 (“This island saw a net loss of 144,000 people from 2010 to 2013, the largest
exodus since a similar period following World War II…”).
27
Danielle Kurtzleben, “Puerto Rico’s Population Continues Rapid Decline,” U.S. News & World Report,
Jan. 2, 2014, available at http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2014/01/02/puerto-ricospopulation-continues-rapid-decline.
28
Lisa Beilfuss, Fitch Cuts Puerto Rico’s Rating Deeper Into Junk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2015,
www.wsj.com/articles/fitch-cuts-puerto-ricos-rating-deeper-into-junk-1427397508 (“[T]he legislature’s
“willingness to pay” has become a significant concern.”).
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debt, (the repayment of which comes directly from sales tax revenues).29 Puerto Rico’s
public corporations make up a large part of the commonwealth’s economic structure.30
For many years, Puerto Rico’s main source of capital was obtained by issuing bonds on
behalf of its public service corporations.31 These public corporations, such as the Water
and Gas Company and the Utility Company, because of the vital importance they played
in maintaining a high standard of daily living for the citizens of Puerto Rico, were
considered cash cows that would sustain the commonwealth’s debt indefinitely.
However, the economic downturn, the declining population, and the over abundance of
public debt together created the perfect storm from which Puerto Rico now finds itself
desperately trying to escape.
The most pressing of Puerto Rico’s financial concerns is its interest payments on
nearly $70 billion dollars of debt, 40% of which is made up of the island’s corporate-like
public entities.32 By comparison, when Detroit filed for bankruptcy in July of 2014, its
public debts were $18 billion.33 However, the clouds over Puerto Rico’s financial picture
could lift with the recent passing of new legislation by Puerto Rico’s Governor Alejandro

29

Aaron Kuriloff, Credit-Rating Firms Downgrade Puerto Rico’s Public Agencies, WALL ST. J., June 27,
2014,
www.wsj.com/articles/credit-rating-firms-downgrade-puerto-ricos-public-agencies-1403905253
(“The bill doesn’t apply to Puerto Rico’s general-obligation or sales-tax bonds, which are backed by the
island’s taxing authority.”).
30
BRECKINRIDGE CAP. ADVISORS, PUERTO RICO’S CHALLENGES, 3 (2012), available at
http://www.breckinridge.com/insights/whitepapers.html?id=1238. (internal citations omitted)
The Commonwealth’s major public corporations have significant and opaque financial
relationships to each other and to the Commonwealth. These intra-governmental capital flows
represent a significant portion of the island’s financial activities, and they are beginning to impact
the island’s larger issuers. Last year, almost 28% of PREPA’s (Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority’s) unpaid bills were owed by delinquent public sector organizations.
31
See Kuriloff, supra note 29 (“It [Puerto Rico] has financed many of its services through a collection of
semipublic and semiprivate entities, which are now loaded up with debt and have weakened prospects for
increasing revenue.”).
32
See Fletcher, supra note 6; see Kuriloff, supra note 29 (“[L]arge, indebted, corporate-like public entities
account for almost 40% of the island’s total debt.”).
33
See Smith et al., supra note 2 (Puerto Rico’s $70 billion debt obligation “dwarfs the approximately $18
billion debt owed by the City of Detroit.”).
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Garcia Padillo.34
B) The Recovery Act
The Puerto Rico Public Corporations Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act
(hereafter, the “Recovery Act,” or, “the Act”), signed by Governor Padilla in 2014, in
effect mimics Chapter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.35 Similar to the
Bankruptcy Code’s requirement that a municipality be authorized to be a debtor by either
state law, or by a representative of the state,36 Chapter 2 of the Recovery Act grants debt
relief to eligible public corporations which are authorized by the Government
Development Bank of Puerto Rico (GDB).37 Chapter 3 of the Recovery Act requires the
public corporation debtor to submit a proposed restructuring plan38 and a list of creditors
who will be affected by the plan.39 As also required by Chapter 9, in order to be approved
under the Recovery Act, the plan must pass a vote by a majority of the votes cast, and
“two-thirds of the aggregate amount of affected debt,” of at least one class of affected
creditors.40 These requirements closely follow the language of Chapter 9 of the Code.41
II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF PUERTO RICO
TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS LAWS
A) Federalism and the Bankruptcy Code
34

Leonard Weiser-Varon et al., A Close Look at Puerto Rico’s Bankruptcy-Like Legislation, LAW360 (July
03, 2014, 9:58 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/553454/a-close-look-at-puerto-rico-s-bankruptcylike-legislation (“On June 28, Puerto Rico’s governor, Alejandro Garcia Padilla, signed into law
restructuring legislation that provides a judicial debt relief process in Puerto Rico’s courts for certain public
corporations…”); see Chutchian, supra note 11.
35
See Recovery Act, Stmt. Of Motives, §E., (“The Recovery Act is modeled on Title 11 of the United
States Code (‘the federal Bankruptcy Code’), and particularly on Chapter 9 of that title.”); Weiser-Varon et
al., supra note 34 (“[T]he legislation is modeled on Chapter 9 and Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
. . . and is in all practical respects a nonfederal bankruptcy statute.”).
36
11 U.S.C. §109(c) (2006).
37
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, No. 14-1518, 2015 WL 522183, at *2, *2 (D. Puerto
Rico Feb. 6, 2015) citing Recovery Act §201(b).
38
Id. at *2 citing Recovery Act §310.
39
Id. at *2 citing Recovery Act §301(d).
40
Id. at *2 citing §315(e).
41
11 U.S.C. §109(c) (2006).

7

One of the primary concerns addressed by the United States Constitution is the
balance between state sovereignty and the power of the federal government. The Tenth
Amendment states that all power not granted to the federal government by the
Constitution is reserved to the states.42 Under Article I of the United States Constitution,
Congress alone is granted the authority to create the Bankruptcy Code.43 However, this
does not mean that the states are not allowed to create their own “collective creditor
regimes”44 based on common law concepts.
A fundamental aspect of the common law insolvency scheme is the creation of a
legal structure for the assignment of an insolvent debtor’s assets as an alternative to
formal bankruptcy proceedings.45 The assignment for the benefit of creditors is a
voluntary transfer of property by the debtor,46 which is inherent in the ownership of
property.47 This transfer of property is a common law right that exists independent of
statute.48 However, this insolvency framework becomes problematic when the debtor’s
assignment of his assets provides preferential treatment to some creditors at the expense
of others.49 “Although outside the bankruptcy context, there is nothing wrong in
preferring certain creditors to others, in the bankruptcy context, preferential transfers are

42

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Alan J. Feld, Note, The Limits Of Bankruptcy Code Preemption: Debt Discharge and Voidable
Preference Reconsidered In Light of Sherwood Partners, 28:3 CARDOZO L. REV., 1447, 1460-1 (2006)
citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 4 (“[T]he Constitution’s Bankruptcy Clause sets forth Congress’s power to
establish ‘uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.’”).
44
Id. at 1448.
45
Id. at 1460-1.
46
Id. at 1448.
47
Id. at 1449 citing Note, Discharge by Assignment For the Benefit of Creditors, 36 VA. L. REV. 813, 813
(1950) (“The right of a debtor to make a voluntary assignment for the benefit of his creditors has always
been recognized as a right inherent in the ownership of property. It does not depend upon statutes, as it
creates an express trust partaking of the nature of a private contract.”).
48
Feld, supra note 43, at 1460 citing Note, Statutory Regulation of Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors,
47 YALE L.J. 944, 945 (1938).
49
Id. at 1449 (“Typically, statutes regulating general assignments do not permit the assignee to prefer
certain creditors to others.”).
43
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usually considered inequitable because the transfer limits funds that would otherwise be
shared by similarly situated creditors.”50
A state’s involvement with creditor transfers, such as assigning a trustee, or
passing legislation to formalize insolvency procedures, conflicts with the Bankruptcy
Code to the extent it goes beyond the common law assignments for the benefit of
creditors51 to provide for a formal structure for the discharge of debt.52 “The presence of a
discharge provision evidences a ‘true’ bankruptcy statute, and, since 1898, has been
considered an essential feature of the bankruptcy scheme in the United States.”53 This is
the central tension between the sovereign power of the states and the reach of the federal
government under the Bankruptcy Code.54
The states themselves have never been allowed access to the Bankruptcy Code,
but the Code was silent on the matter of a municipality claiming bankruptcy until 1934,
when, in the aftermath of the Great Depression, many municipalities became insolvent.55
Municipal bankruptcies were problematic for the Code from a Tenth Amendment

50

Id. at 1450 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1452 (“[S]ome state statutes might be preempted [by the Bankruptcy Code] if they constitute
‘complete bankruptcy legislation’ and do not merely codify preexisting common law concepts underlying
an assignment for the benefit of creditors.”).
52
Id. at 1451 (stating that the three main Supreme Court cases on which Judge Alex Kozinski in Sherwood
Partners Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir.)(2005), relied on in determining that the Bankruptcy
Code preempts the preference avoidance portion of the California state creditor benefit assignment law,
“stand for the proposition that discharge is the limit of preemption.” (citing Stellwagon v. Clum, 245 U.S.
605 (1918); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929); Pobreslo v. Joseph M. Boyd Co., 287 U.S. 518
(1933))).
53
Id. at 1455.
54
Feld, supra note 43, at 1452 (citing Nahum L. Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory Under Article 9
Of The UCC And The Preference Problem, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 49, 59 (1962) (“No invasion by a state law
affording debtors a discharge will be tolerated.”)(“State laws will be suspended to the extent of actual
conflict with the Act.”).
55
Juliet M. Moringiello, “Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy,” 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403,
440 (2014) (“Congress enacted the predecessor statute to today’s Chapter 9 in 1934, in emergency
legislation passed as the United States was recovering from the Great Depression.”); John C. Philo, Local
Government Fiscal Emergencies and the Disenfranchisement of Victims of the Global Recession, 13 J. L.
SOC’Y 71, 80 (2011) (explaining that almost 5,000 cities defaulted on their debts during the Great
Depression).
51
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perspective,56 since in order for a municipality to declare bankruptcy, the municipality
was required to use federal law.57 A municipality granted the right to declare bankruptcy
by the federal government led to a constitutional conflict between the federal government
and the state.58 Congress could not grant a municipality the power to declare bankruptcy
without violating the Tenth Amendment’s protection of the state’s sovereignty.59
However, a state could not provide its municipalities the right to declare bankruptcy
based on state statutes because a discharge from debt “could not be enforced against a
creditor from another state who did not participate in the discharge proceeding”60 under
the Contracts Clause.61 Over time, the balance of power between the two was delineated
through case law, as legal challenges became more frequent.
Congress’ first attempt to create a national municipal bankruptcy scheme in 1936
was struck down by the Supreme Court in the 1936.62 Congress’ intent in passing the act
was to bridge the gap between the limitations imposed on the federal courts by the Tenth
Amendment and limitations imposed on the states by the Contracts Clause.63 In so doing,
Congress extended the Bankruptcy Code to allow the federal government to oversee the

56

Moringiello, supra note 55, at 451 (The Supreme Court upheld the 1937 bankruptcy statute, known as
Chapter X, passed by Congress at the center of the case of United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938),
because it recognized that the statute was “narrowly drawn so as not to interfere with state sovereignty,” in
deference to “the states’ control over their fiscal affairs.”).
57
Id. at 451 (The Supreme Court in United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938), “emphasized the policy of
cooperation implied by the bankruptcy law, explaining that the state ‘invites the intervention of the
bankruptcy power to save its agency which the State itself is powerless to rescue…’”).
58
Id. at 451 (citing United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938)) (“[T]hrough the state’s ‘cooperation with
the national government the needed relief is given.”).
59
Id. at 451 (citing United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938)) (“[T]he debtor municipality must have
been authorized by state law to take all action necessary to implement the plan.”).
60
Id. at 444 (citing Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827)).
61
U.S. CONST. art. 1, §10, cl. 1.
62
Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936) (The Act of May 24, 1934,
added three sections (§§ 78-80) to the Bankruptcy Code, purporting to permit State subdivisions that were
unable to pay their debts to resort to the federal bankruptcy courts to readjust their obligations as they came
due.).
63
Moringiello, supra note 55, at 440.
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financial restructuring of a state’s municipalities.64 The Supreme Court found this
extension of power to be akin to the limitation imposed on the states by the Contracts
Clause.65 In essence, the Court held that the end results, requiring a creditor to take less
than what he had originally contracted for, which was denied to the states by the
Contracts Clause,66 could not be achieved by an act of Congress.67
Congress replaced the first national municipal bankruptcy law in 1937.68 This
second attempt at a federal municipal bankruptcy structure, known as Chapter X, closely
mirrored the relationship between the states and the common law insolvency scheme.69
This approach protected the sovereignty of the states by granting the Bankruptcy Court
the power to oversee the restructuring of the municipality’s finances only if the debtor
municipality was first granted authorization by state law.70 Congress made the municipal
bankruptcy provisions a permanent part of the Bankruptcy Code in 1946.71
B) Puerto Rico and United States Statehood
An important question to consider in assessing the constitutionality of Puerto
Rico’s Recovery Act is whether Puerto Rico should be considered no different than a
state, and therefore denied the right to access the Bankruptcy Code, or whether as a
sovereign entity if it is free to make its own laws regarding debt restructuring.
The United States colonized Puerto Rico after winning the Spanish-American
64

See Ashton v. Cameron Cnty., 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
See id.
66
Moringiello, supra note 55, at 410 (“The Contracts Clause [ ] prohibits the states from passing laws that
would force a creditor to accept less than what it is owed on a claim without that creditor’s consent.”).
67
Ashton v. Cameron Cnty., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936) (“The Constitution was careful to provide that ‘no
State shall pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.’ This she may not do under the form of a
bankruptcy act or otherwise. Nor do we think she can accomplish the same end by granting any permission
necessary to enable Congress so to do.”).
68
U.S. v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
69
Act of August 16, 1937, 50 Stat. 653.
70
See Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938); see also Moringiello, supra note 55, at 452.
71
Kenneth N. Klee, Introduction, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 221, 221 (2012).
65
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War in 1898.72 In 1917, Puerto Rico’s citizens became United States citizens73 when
Puerto Rico became a United States territory after the passage of the Jones-Shafroth Act
by President Woodrow Wilson.74 Even though citizens of the United States, the citizens
of Puerto Rico do not have the same rights and responsibilities as American citizens. For
example, Puerto Rico’s citizens are not allowed to vote in presidential elections, nor do
they pay federal taxes.75 However, the United States Supreme Court, for the most part,
treats Puerto Rico as if it were one of the states.
In the case of Examining Board of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de
Otero,76 the Supreme Court observed that Puerto Rico could conceivably be considered a
state and noted its uniqueness: “We readily concede that Puerto Rico occupies a
relationship to the United States that has no parallel in our history… .”77 More pointedly,
in the case of Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,78 the Court approvingly
quoted an observation from the First Circuit that “Puerto Rico has … not become a State
in the federal Union like the 48 States, but it would seem to have become a State within a
common and accepted meaning of the word.”79 In the Supreme Court case of Rodriguez
v. Popular Democratic Party,80 the Court expressly stated that “[i]t is not disputed that the
fundamental protections of the United States Constitution extend to the inhabitants of

72

Mireya Navarro, A New Debate on the Fate (And State) of Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1989,
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/30/us/a-new-debate-on-the-fate-and-state-of-puertorico.html?pagewanted=all.
73
8 U.S.C. §1402 (2006) (“All persons born in Puerto Rico on or after January 13, 1941, and subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, are citizens of the United States at birth.”).
74
Andrew Glass, Puerto Ricans granted U.S. citizenship March 2, 1917, POLITICO (Mar. 2, 2008, 7:42
AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2008/03/puerto-ricans-granted-us-citizenship-march-2-1917008771#ixzz3nWobwqkI.
75
Id.
76
426 U.S. 572.
77
Id. at 596.
78
416 U.S. 663 (1974).
79
Id. at 672 (1974) quoting Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 377, 387 (1st Cir. 1953).
80
457 U.S. 1 (1982).
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Puerto Rico.”81 The Court even went so far as to say, “[i]n particular, we have held that
Puerto Rico is subject to the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection
of the laws.”82
Of greater concern is whether Puerto Rico’s public corporations qualify as
municipalities under the Code. The Code defines a municipality as a “political
subdivision” or “public agency” or “instrumentality of a state.”83 One of the more
problematic aspects of Puerto Rico’s financial situation is the lack of distinction between
Puerto Rico and its public corporations, or as The Washington Post referred to them,
Puerto Rico’s “state-run” corporations.84
For example,
[Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority] PREPA is
governed by a nine member board comprised of the
Secretary of DTPW, and six members appointed by the
Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate, and
two members [who] represent the consumers’ interest
elected in a referendum carried out by the Puerto Rico
Consumer Affairs Department. … The Commonwealth
provides financial support to PREPA through legislative
appropriations.85
Furthermore, according to one report, “successive administrations turned to the bond
market to plug gaping budget deficits.”86 If there is no distinction between Puerto Rico
and its state-run corporations, then how can it be argued that Puerto Rico’s utility
companies should be allowed to declare bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code, where

81

Id. at 7.
Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
83
11 U.S.C. §101(40) (2006).
84
Michael A. Fletcher, Can Bankruptcy Save Puerto Rico’s State-Run Corporations?, WASH. POST, Feb.
26, 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/02/26/can-bankruptcy-save-puerto-ricosstate-run-corporations/.
85
JESÚS F. MÉNDEZ RODRÍGUEZ ET AL., P.R. TREASURY DEP’T, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL
REPORT 73 (2011).
86
Fletcher, supra note 6.
82
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Puerto Rico is prohibited from using the Code, when in effect they are mere extensions of
the sovereign itself?87 Municipalities like Detroit and New York City were separate
entities with politically appointed governing bodies, separate and apart from the state.
The same cannot be said for the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA).88
Although the Bankruptcy Code provides for an instrumentality of the state to
declare bankruptcy under its definition of a municipality, similar to its treatment of
Puerto Rico, the Code flat-out denies Puerto Rico’s municipalities from seeking debt
adjustment pursuant to Chapter 9.89 No matter how Puerto Rico’s financial structure is
analyzed, Puerto Rico90 and its municipalities91 are denied reorganization protection
under Chapter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
C) The Recovery Act and The Supremacy Clause
Another important issue to consider in determining the constitutionality of the
Recovery Act is whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts Puerto Rico’s legislation. Article
4, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, known as The Supremacy Clause, states
that the Constitution is the Supreme Law of the land.92 As such, where Congress has
written a law under authority of the Constitution, a state may not write a law to the
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contrary.93 Federal law may preempt state law 1) expressly, 2) by implied occupation of a
field, or 3) by implied exclusion of conflicting state regulation.94
When Congress acts within constitutional limits, it
may expressly preempt state law. Field preemption occurs
when the federal regulatory scheme is so ‘pervasive’ that it
would be a reasonable inference that Congress left no room
for the States to supplement it. Finally, as for conflict
preemption, where the federal government, in the exercise
of its superior authority in a field, has enacted a complete
scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard . .
. states cannot, inconsistent with the purpose of Congress,
conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal
law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.95
Although Congress’ jurisdiction to create the Bankruptcy Code is directly
delegated to it by the United States Constitution, set forth in Article I, Section 8, Clause
4,96 it is widely recognized that it was not Congress’ intent to preempt the field.97 On the
contrary, it is critical for an effective national bankruptcy scheme that the Code work in
conjunction with state sovereignty.98 The limit of state power in the realm of municipal
bankruptcy is the establishment of the priority of the municipality’s creditors. State
sovereignty, with regards to the enactment of insolvency statutes, does not permit states
to determine whether a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding will be repaid. The power to
discharge debt belongs solely to Congress.99 The Act however, ignores such state
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restrictions by going beyond a common law bankruptcy scheme to provide a debtor with
a way to fully discharge its debts.
The District Court case of Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico100
addressed the legality of Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act based on the consolidated
complaints of Puerto Rico’s public corporation bondholders.101 The plaintiffs in Franklin
California made a Supremacy Clause claim, as well as a Contracts Clause claim and a
Takings Clause claim.102 Regarding the plaintiff’s Supremacy Clause claim, the Court
held that in its passage of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress expressly preempted state law
to the extent that it binds non-consenting creditors.103
The plaintiff’s Contracts Clause claim stems from Article I, Section 10, Clause 1
of the United States Constitution, which prohibits states from interfering in the
contractual agreements between private parties. The bondholders in Franklin California
claimed that the Recovery Act violates the Contracts Clause by impairing the contractual
obligations imposed by the Authority Act and the Trust Agreement, contractual
obligations entered into by the public corporations with its debt holders.104 The court held
that Section 903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits states from passing laws that adjust
or discharge financial agreements between private parties which require a creditor to
accept an amount less than is owed under his agreement with the debtor.105
Under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, The Takings
Clause forbids the federal government from taking private property for public use without

100

No. 14-1518, 2015 WL 522183 (D. Puerto Rico Feb. 6, 2015).
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just compensation to the owner.106 This same provision is applied to state and local
governments by the Fourteenth Amendment under the Due Process Clause.107 In Franklin
California, the plaintiffs claimed that the Recovery Act allows Puerto Rico to take the
plaintiff-bondholder’s contractual right to seek the appointment of a receiver and their
right to liens on Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority’s revenues without just
compensation in violation of the Takings Clause.108
Although its ruling is certain to be appealed, the District Court ultimately found
the Recovery Act to be unconstitutional as a violation of both the United States
Constitution’s Supremacy and Contracts Clauses.109 As for the right of Puerto Rico’s
public corporations to claim bankruptcy protection, the Court devoted exactly one
sentence to this concern, stating flatly, “Puerto Rico municipalities are expressly
prohibited from seeking debt adjustment pursuant to Chapter 9.”110

III. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR PUERTO RICO’S FISCAL PROBLEMS
Regardless of whether the Recovery Act is ultimately held to be unconstitutional,
the commonwealth will still need to address its financial problems. This section explores
the ways other municipalities have addressed similar fiscal crises and considers which
options might provide a workable solution for Puerto Rico.
Beyond the question of the constitutionality of the Act, the problem with the
solution put forth by Puerto Rico lies in the fact that Puerto Rico itself is an interested
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party.111 Being an interested party to a reform plan is not necessarily an indication of a
failure to create a workable plan,112 but the lack of oversight is troubling.113 Since Puerto
Rico has a vested interest in eliminating its public corporations’ debts without being
required to make any changes, Puerto Rico’s passage of the Recovery Act provides a
solution which lacks hope for any significant reform.114 By contrast, when New York
City faced a substantial financial crisis in the 1970’s,115 even though Chapter 9 had been
amended specifically to make it easier for a municipality of New York’s size to enter into
bankruptcy, New York City declined to use it.116 Instead, the state legislature established
the Municipal Assistance Corporation, which placed the city’s finances under the
supervision of a control board, which included state officials.117
In all likelihood, the debts of Puerto Rico’s public entities will become the burden
of Puerto Rico, and from a creditor perspective it might be difficult to distinguish
between Puerto Rico and its public corporations going forward. As it currently stands, the
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In re City of Detroit, Mich., 504 B.R. 97, 172-3 (2013) (Congress added a requirement to chapter 9 – 11
U.S.C. §109(c)(5) – that a debtor must have attempted a pre-bankruptcy good-faith negotiation with its
creditors before it is eligible to use chapter 9.); Moringiello, supra note 55, at 419 (“The Moral Hazard”
argument).
112
Mario H. Lopez, Republicans Abandoning Principles in Bailout for Puerto Rico, THE DAILY CALLER,
(Mar. 30, 2015), http://dailycaller.com/2015/03/30/republicans-abandoning-principles-in-bailout-forpuerto-rico/ (“Puerto Rico has a mind-boggling $73 billion in debt that has no chance of being repaid
because there is no political will to undertake the budget cuts, pension reform, and tax policy overhaul that
is necessary.”).
113
Matt Wirz et al., Puerto Rico, Investors Enlist Ex-IMF Officials, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2015,
www.wsj.com/articles/puerto-rico-investors-enlist-ex-imf-officials-1428878228 (“The Commonwealth
needs to commit to developing a comprehensive plan that balances the budget with timely and transparent
financial reporting.”).
114
See Moringiello, supra note 55, at 415 (Unlike Chapter 9, under which only the debtor may propose a
plan of adjustment.).
115
Adam Lisberg et al., Fiscal Crisis in 1975 Taught New York Hard Lessons of Chopping, Freezing That
Are Handy Now, NY DAILY NEWS, Feb. 3, 2009, www.nydailynews.com/news/money/fiscal-crisis-1975taught-new-york-hard-lessons-chopping-freezing-handy-article-1.388460.
116
Moringiello, supra note 55, at 418 (quoting Michael W. McConnell et al., When Cities Go Broke: A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 472 (1993)) (“Both New York
and Cleveland experienced significant difficulties ‘due in large part to municipal mismanagement,’ and
neither one resorted to Chapter 9 to resolve its problems.”).
117
Id. at 38.

18

credit rating of some of Puerto Rico’s public corporation’s bonds have already been
reduced to junk status by the credit rating agencies.118 From an investor’s perspective, it
is not an unnatural conclusion to think that the inability of Puerto Rico’s public
corporations to honor its financial obligations would extend to Puerto Rico itself.119 Even
if the Recovery Act is ultimately struck down as being unconstitutional, rebuilding Puerto
Rico’s credit rating will not be easy.120
The following scenarios represent possible approaches Puerto Rico could use to
restructure its finances without resorting to the use of the Bankruptcy Code.
Approach 1: United States Bailout
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the United States government bailed out
947 companies totaling $613 billion in disbursements.121 It is clear from the size of this
list that the idea of the United States government bailing out failing institutions after the
economic meltdown is not out of the realm of possibility. Entities on this list of recipients
include Chrysler, GM and Citibank, to name just a few.122 One positive aspect of a
government bailout, in addition to the immediate financial relief, is that in providing
significant financial backing, Congress often makes demands that changes be
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implemented to help safeguard its investment.123 These demands for changes take the
difficult – and often politically unpopular – decisions necessary for the restructuring
process out of the hands of, in the case of a municipality, elected officials who need voter
approval to stay in office.124 This approach allows those in charge to make the changes
necessary to restructure without fear of losing their jobs. Unfortunately, this method
denies voters the opportunity to have a say in the process, at least until the next election.
In the aftermath of the 2008 downturn, a great deal has been written about the
government bailout of private and semi-private companies at the expense of taxpayers.125
Another interpretation of the government bailouts is that they were shrewd investments in
companies when their shares were trading at historically low prices.126 One such example
was the government bailout of Fannie and Freddie Mac. Created by the United States
government to help provide home mortgages to the middle class,127 Fannie and Freddie
Mac were largely considered by investors to be backed by the full faith and credit of the
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United States.128 On the verge of bankruptcy in 2008, the federal government took both
companies under receivership.129 The government helped keep the companies afloat by
offering a $187.5 billion loan.130 Today, that entire loan has been paid back and Fannie
and Freddie are on their way to being profitable again.131 The same can also be said of the
federal bailout of both GM and Chrysler.132 Similarly, with regards to Puerto Rico’s
public corporations, if the federal government provided the capital necessary to help
restructure their outstanding debts, it could be another opportunity to buy a company’s
debt at rock-bottom prices with the potential for future profits.
Although the government was willing to bailout once-great companies like
Chrysler and GM, it has rarely shown the same willingness to do so for a municipality,133
even for three of the nation’s largest – Detroit, Washington, D.C., and New York City.
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Detroit, Michigan, once famous for being the home of the Big Three auto
manufacturers, had been on a steady decline for decades as a change in consumer
preference for foreign made cars accelerated during the mid-1980s.134 Unable to stem the
tide against it after the 2008 recession, Detroit found itself unable to pay its bills after its
residential and business entities were largely abandoned.135 Nowhere in the public
discourse about how to turn around the finances of this once great city was the suggestion
of a government bailout;136 and none was ever provided. In 2012, Detroit was allowed to
declare bankruptcy and is the largest United States city to ever do so.137
In the early-nineties, Washington D.C. faced its own fiscal crisis.138 In attempting
to help get Washington back on its feet, Congress passed the District of Columbia
Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995.139 “The Act created a
financial control board to oversee the finances of the District of Columbia and granted the
board the power to override decisions made by the District of Columbia’s mayor and city
council.”140 It is important to note that D.C., similar to Puerto Rico, is not a state, nor is it
a municipality.141 Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code requires a state to authorize a
municipality to access the Code.142 Because Washington D.C. is not a municipality or a
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State, Congress was able to create the control board to oversee the restructuring of its
finances.143 Significantly though, although Congress was instrumental in helping to
establish a financial restructuring plan for D.C., it did not provide a bailout.
As for New York City, a headline from 1975 referring to President Ford’s
resistance to helping New York City with its fiscal crisis of that time seems to sum up the
government’s perspective on municipal bailouts. The headline read, “Ford to City: Drop
Dead.”144 With this history in mind, it is highly unlikely that the Congress will provide
such assistance to Puerto Rico,145 but never say never.146
Approach 2: Creditor Negotiations
From the most basic perspective, Puerto Rico’s use of its Recovery Act could be
seen as “the nuclear option.”147 That is to say that its use would completely wipe away all
of the debt of its public corporations, but it would also completely wipe away all of the
equity of its bondholders. This is a very drastic move that would have far reaching
effects.148 Although much more difficult, negotiating with creditors in an attempt to find
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a solution that takes the needs of both sides into account is the smartest approach. As
helpful as it may appear to immediately eliminate the financial pressure the
commonwealth currently faces, the after shock would be so great that the repercussions
would be felt for years to come, in ways that could prove equally painful. A compromise
obtained via a dialogue with its creditors on the other hand will not provide immediate
and absolute relief, but neither will the after-effect be quite so painful either.149 A good
example of this approach comes from New York City’s financial crisis of 1975.
In the fall of 1975, New York City’s finances were on the brink of collapse.150
After years of more affluent city-dwellers relocating to the suburbs, New York City
found itself in precisely the same predicament Puerto Rico is currently facing. The
defections of high-income earners to the suburbs left New York City with a diminished
tax base, a seemingly insurmountable amount of debt due to a changing economy, and a
commitment to a large number of social programs for a city that could no longer afford
them.151 When reviewing news reports from that time, what is most striking, and most
glaringly absent from the reports regarding Puerto Rico’s current situation, is the struggle
between New York City and its creditors to find a workable solution.152 Significantly, the
Bankruptcy Code requires debtors seeking Chapter 9 protection to negotiate for a “good
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faith” settlement with its creditors as a prerequisite for declaring bankruptcy.153 Yet, in
the articles written about Puerto Rico’s financial troubles, little has been mentioned about
the efforts Puerto Rico has taken to renegotiate with its creditors.154
Although New York City’s brush with bankruptcy was difficult for those who
lived through it, the approach used to rescue the city’s finances without claiming
bankruptcy,155 or receiving a government bailout,156 provides a still relevant blueprint for
today’s fiscal crises. Among the approaches that Puerto Rico might consider in
renegotiating its debts without claiming bankruptcy is to alter the terms of the repayment.
If the debt that comes to maturity this year could be restructured so that the payments are
reduced to close to zero now, but then gradually increase over the life of the debt, it
would give Puerto Rico some space to breathe by providing it more time to turn its
financial situation around, while also making sure its creditors are still made whole. On
the interest payment side, when an interest payment comes due, instead of requiring the
interest payment to be paid now, if the interest is added to the principal amount due on an
on-going basis, again, this would provide enough breathing room to help Puerto Rico get
back on its feet, but does not allow it to completely escape its financial obligations.
Another option might be to split each share into two. The first new share having
153
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the original coupon and maturity date, the second newly created share having the original
coupon, but not being payable until after the first round of shares are completely paid off,
thereby reducing the amount of interest due immediately. This is not ideal, but it is far
better than having the obligation being wiped away completely. Another option could be
a compromise between the parties that would reduce the amount of debt, without altering
share amount or the maturity of the debt. Obviously, this is the least attractive option for
creditors, but it might be the best option to replace a worse-case scenario where otherwise
all shareholder equity would be eliminated.
In some sovereign debt situations, there have on occasion been bondholders who
refuse to go along with the negotiated compromise, suing for specific performance
instead.157 In the case of Elliot Assocs. v. Banco de la Nacion,158 a holdout bondholder
sued Peru, during its 1983 financial crisis, in order to enforce the judgment of an earlier
case, Pravin Banker v. Banco Popular del Peru,159 against the sovereign for not honoring
the terms of its debt issuance.160 In Pravin, Peru tried to restructure its debt by eliminating
its bondholder-creditors and then tried to raise new capital by issuing more bonds.161 The
holdout debt holder, hedge fund Elliot Associates, sued Peru for its attempt to restructure
its finances at the expense of its creditors. The court found in favor of the Elliot
Associates, who then sued Peru to enforce the Pravin ruling in the United States, as well
as many other jurisdictions.162 The United States court issued an attachment order against
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payments on Peru’s new debt offering in the amount of $55 million.163
To bypass the risk of attachment in New York, Peru
sought to use Euroclear, in Brussels, to make the planned
payments. But Elliot had filed an attachment order there as
well. And although the initial request for the ex parte
injunction in Brussels was denied, the Court of Appeals
reversed and granted the injunction. At this point, Peru
faced the risk of defaulting on its Brady bonds [the new
issuance], which in turn would have triggered cross-default
provisions and accelerations in its other bonds. To avoid
this sequence of events, Peru paid Elliot $56.3 million in an
out-of-court settlement.164
Two important lessons can be gleaned from Peru’s financial crisis. The first is
that, from the United States to Brussels, contractual obligations are not to be taken
lightly. Secondly, as attractive as it may seem to a struggling entity, claiming bankruptcy
is neither an easy solution, nor a sure thing.165

IV. THE COST OF BANKRUPTCY
Significantly, the legislation passed by Governor Padillo stops short of allowing
Puerto Rico itself from using the statute to restructure its general obligation bonds.166
However, it would be in Puerto Rico’s best interest for long-term growth to avoid use of
this law.167 The most prudent path that Puerto Rico can take is to restructure the finances
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of its public corporations so as to not destroy its investors’ equity, thereby protecting its
good will.168 The issuance of debt has been a significant source of capital for the
sovereign.169 Many investors who purchased Puerto Rico’s public corporation’s debt did
so for its triple-tax exempt status,170 but also because municipal bonds were thought to be
less risky than other investments.171 Traditionally, such investors were retirees seeking to
gain income from their investments,172 rather than growth.173 Many retirees purchase
municipal bonds for the payment of dividends as a form of income replacement.174 As it
currently stands, mutual funds are the biggest holders of Puerto Rico’s triple tax-free
bonds.175 For Puerto Rico to eliminate its income payment on its debt, or to eliminate its
debt altogether would be devastating to these investors, which would greatly damage
investor confidence in Puerto Rico. Once investor trust in Puerto Rico is destroyed, that
faith will not be easily regained and the cost of raising capital will increase
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dramatically.176 It cannot be overstated how drastic a measure it is for a municipality to
claim bankruptcy.177
Although the main focus of a bankruptcy claim will, by its nature, be centered on
the numbers, there is also the “moral hazard” component to consider as well.178 The
moral hazard in bankruptcy is the tendency of debtors to neglect their repayment of debts
to devote resources to their own interests,179 resulting in not only the destruction of its
shareholder’s equity, but their trust as well. Damaging investor confidence is not only
harmful to the debtor,180 but also affects the larger economy. When investors’ equity is
destroyed, the ill will left in its wake creates a destabilizing force, not just for the debtor
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in the capital markets, but for the flow of capital in general.181 The good will of investors
is critical to an efficient market, which in turn is a vital component to a productive
economy. Investor confidence is as critical to the financial structure of both a business
and society as a balanced asset sheet.182 Bankruptcy should be seen a last resort.

CONCLUSION
Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act represents the usurpation of Congress’ singular
authority to allow for the discharge of debt under the Bankruptcy Code, in violation of
the Supremacy Clause. Regardless, there is a strong chance that Puerto Rico will be able
to relieve itself of the burden of its debt, simultaneously destroying its creditors’
equity.183 However, doing so is not in Puerto Rico’s best interests. The most prudent
approach would be to find a way to be pay back the debt that is owed, without completely
eliminating it. This article has illustrated a number of approaches that could be used to
address Puerto Rico’s fiscal crisis. No matter which approach Puerto Rico ultimately
chooses, it is clear it will not be without pain for all parties involved.
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